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Abstract
In a dynamic labor market worker-¯rm matches dissolve frequently causing workers to
separate and ¯rms to look for replacements. A separation may be initiated by the worker
(a quit) or the ¯rm (a layo®), or may result from a joint decision. A dissolution of a
worker-¯rm match may be ine±cient if it can be prevented by wage renegotiation. In
this paper we study worker separations in the Dutch labor market. From an analysis
of matched worker-¯rm data we conclude that both quits and layo®s are less likely to
occur in high quality matches. We also ¯nd that workers with a high propensity to quit
are o®ered higher wages to prevent them to quit. Similarly, workers with a high layo®
probability give up some of their wage to prevent them from being laid-o®. Despite these
wage renegotiations some ine±ciency in separations remains. However, there is a clear
di®erence between quits and layo®s. Whereas ine±cient quits are rare ine±cient layo®s
occur frequently. These phenomena may be related to downward wage rigidity. While it is
easy to renegotiate higher wages to prevent quits it is much more di±cult to renegotiate
lower wages to prevent layo®s even if that would overall be bene¯cial to the workers
involved.
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In a dynamic labor market workers change their labor market position frequently. When a
worker enters a job the wage is negotiated on the basis of the expected quality of the match
between worker and ¯rm. Both parties take advantage of the match and split-up the match-
speci¯c surplus through wage negotiations. The match-speci¯c surplus may be a®ected by
shocks and change over time. Therefore, the employment relationship is continuously reevalu-
ated. A relationship may be terminated if the value of the match for either one or both parties
falls below the value of an outside option. As a result, a separation may be initiated by a worker
or a ¯rm, or result from a joint decision. The larger the value of the match-speci¯c surplus, the
lower the probability that a separation occurs. A separation initiated by the worker is denoted
a quit, a ¯rm-initiated separation is denoted a layo®.
A separation is ine±cient if it could have been prevented through wage renegotiation. If
a worker leaves a ¯rm because of a higher outside wage the ¯rm might have prevented this
by o®ering a higher wage too. That would have reduced the ¯rm's part of the match surplus
but could still have been pro¯table if the match surplus of a newly hired worker is even lower.
Similarly, the ¯ring of a worker is ine±cient if a wage reduction would have prevented the
dismissal and the worker would be better o® when the outside wage is lower than the reduced
wage. A separation is e±cient if the match surplus became negative or if it is too small for
compensation, i.e. insu±cient to compensate the worker who wants to leave or the ¯rm that
wants to ¯re a worker. So, whether a separation is e±cient or not depends on the size of the
match surplus, the size of the shocks and the possibility to renegotiate the wage. If wages
cannot be renegotiated some separations may be ine±cient while others are e±cient. The
distinction between quits and layo®s is related to wage rigidity, i.e. either the worker or the
¯rm is not willing or able to renegotiate the sharing rule governing the costs and returns to
¯rm-speci¯c human capital (Becker (1962) and Parsons (1972)). If wages are fully °exible a
separation is always e±cient and the distinction between quits and layo®s is irrelevant (Burdett
(1978), Jovanovic (1979), Mortensen (1988)).1 Nevertheless, in this case the separation is most
1However, McLaughlin (1991) has shown that even in the case of e±cient separations, there can be a
meaningful distinction between quits and layo®s, which is based on who initiates the separation by demanding
2likely classi¯ed as a quit because a layo® would require a formal action by the employer and is
often a costly event due to employment protection legislation.
In this paper we investigate why worker-¯rm matches dissolve. From a simple theoretical
model we derive three predictions. First, separations are less likely to occur if the joint match
speci¯c surplus is high. Second, some separations may be ine±cient because they occur when
there is still a positive match-speci¯c surplus. Third, ine±cient separations may be avoided
through renegotiations. In our analysis based on Dutch matched worker-¯rm data we investigate
to what extent we can ¯nd empirical evidence for these theoretical ¯ndings.
In the empirical part of the paper we de¯ne a proxy for the match surplus to investigate
whether indeed matches are less likely to dissolve when the match surplus is high. We use
the match surplus as explanatory variables in separation estimates. Indeed we ¯nd that both
quits and layo®s are less likely to occur when the match surplus is high. Then, we investigate
whether indeed wages are renegotiated. Here we use the expected probability to quit or being
laid-o® as an explanatory variable in wage growth estimates ¯nding that a high quit probability
has a positive e®ect on wage growth while a high layo® probability has a negative e®ect. From
this we derive that indeed some wage renegotiation occurs. Finally, we use the results of the
empirical analysis to ¯nd an indication of the extent to which quits and layo®s that occurred
where e±cient or ine±cient.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we present a theoretical model about
e±cient and ine±cient separations and give a brief review of previous literature. Section 3
describes the dataset we use and presents some stylized facts. In section 4 the results of our
empirical analysis are presented. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Theory and previous research
2.1 Theoretical model
Our theoretical model is based on Farber (1999). We assume that the employment relationship
between the worker i and the ¯rm j at time t generates a match-speci¯c revenue. The value of
a wage revision. Then, quits are worker-initiated separations that result from censored wage increases, while
layo®s are ¯rm-initiated separations that result from censored wage cuts.
3the production generated by the worker equals Vijt and the wage of the worker equals Wijt. For
the ¯rm the match generates a surplus which is equal to the di®erence between the production
value and the wage of the worker:
S
F
ijt = Vijt ¡ Wijt (1)
For the worker the match generates a surplus which is equal to the di®erence between the wage
and the alternative income At which the worker could earn outside ¯rm j:
S
W
ijt = Wijt ¡ At (2)
The alternative income At is the market wage for given worker characteristics, such as education






ijt = Vijt ¡ At (3)
Or, in other words, total match-speci¯c surplus is equal to the value of the production minus
the alternative earnings of the worker.2 The surplus is divided between worker and ¯rm through
wage negotiations that generate a sharing rule such that ¯rms receive a share ¯ijt and workers
receive a share (1 ¡ ¯ijt), with 0 · ¯ · 1. The wage is equal to the alternative earnings plus
the share of the match-speci¯c surplus:
Wijt = At + (1 ¡ ¯ijt)Sijt (4)
Now consider what happens if we introduce labor market dynamics by allowing for the occur-
rence of two types of shocks to the surplus, shocks to the alternative earnings and shocks to the
match-speci¯c productivity. First we consider a shock to the alternative earnings which may
lead to a quit:
At+1 = At + µt+1 (5)
where µ can be considered as an external shock, which is a random variable with mean zero
drawn from the distribution function g(µ). If no wage renegotiations are possible and changing
2Note that in this simple set-up the ¯rm could hire a new worker at wage At and produce Vjt=At so there
is no match surplus. Hiring and ¯ring costs for the ¯rm and separation costs for the worker are assumed to
be zero for computational simplicity. However, introducing positive hiring and ¯ring costs and separation costs
does not change the predictions of the model.
4labor market position is costless, a worker quits if the alternative income exceeds the wage he
receives in the ¯rm:
At+1 > Wijt
µt+1 > (1 ¡ ¯ijt)Sijt (6)
Equation (6) shows that the worker is less likely to quit when the value of the workers' surplus
is larger.
Similarly, some match-speci¯c shock may occur which gives rise to a layo®. This match-speci¯c
shock Á is a random variable with mean zero drawn from the distribution function f(Á). The
shock a®ects the value of production of the worker in the ¯rm:
Vij;t+1 = Vijt + Át+1 (7)
The ¯rm will layo® the worker if the ¯rm' surplus falls below zero:
Vij;t+1 < Wijt
Át+1 < ¡¯ijtSijt (8)
Equation (8) indicates that the worker is laid o® if the negative shock is su±ciently large to
outweigh the ¯rm's share of the surplus.
In this model we can identify both e±cient and ine±cient separations. An e±cient separa-
tion (ES) occurs if the joint surplus of the match falls below zero after the shocks have occurred.
The e±cient separation condition can be de¯ned as follows:
Sij;t+1 < 0
Sijt < µt+1 ¡ Át+1 (9)
A separation is e±cient if the positive shock to the alternative wage and the negative match-
speci¯c shock are su±ciently large to o®set the value of surplus. Note that e±cient separations
are independent of the ¯rm's share of the joint match surplus. E±cient separations can be
subdivided in e±cient quits and e±cient layo®s. An e±cient quit (EQ) occurs if the external
5shock µ exceeds the value of the worker surplus and if the sum of both shocks exceeds the joint
match surplus, i.e.,
Sijt < µt+1 ¡ Át+1 and µt+1 > (1 ¡ ¯ijt)Sijt (10)
Since the sum of both the external and the match-speci¯c shock is larger than the initial
match surplus, the joint match surplus in the next period falls below zero. Hence, there is
no renegotiation possible such that the worker can be compensated for the external shock to
alternative earnings. Similarly, an e±cient layo® (EL) occurs if the value of the match-speci¯c
shock exceeds the ¯rm surplus and if the sum of both shocks exceeds the joint match surplus,
i.e.,
Sijt < µt+1 ¡ Át+1 and Át+1 < ¡¯ijtSijt (11)
Such a layo® is e±cient since the sum of both shocks is too large, such that there is no renego-
tiation possible such that the ¯rm can be compensated for the match-speci¯c shock.
A separation is ine±cient if total match surplus is positive. If the shock to the alternative
earnings is su±ciently large it will be pro¯table for the worker to quit, but this also destroys
the positive ¯rm surplus. Similarly, if the match-speci¯c shock is su±ciently negative if will be
pro¯table for the employer to ¯re the worker, but this also destroys the positive worker surplus.
Hence, the ine±cient quit (IQ) condition can be de¯ned as follows:
(1 ¡ ¯ijt)Sijt < µt+1 < Sijt + Át+1 (12)
Similarly, the ine±cient layo®s (IL) can be de¯ned as:
µt+1 ¡ Sijt < Át+1 < ¡¯ijtSijt (13)
Renegotiation of the wage may prevent ine±cient quits and layo®s. As soon as the sum of
both shocks is smaller than the joint match surplus, ¯ijt can be renegotiated (¯ij;t+1) in order
to redistribute the joint surplus. Then, the number of quits and layo®s will be reduced.3
A graphical illustration of e±cient and ine±cient separations is given in Figure 1.4 Here, X
denotes the original match, before some shock has occurred. On the axes, the match-speci¯c (Á)
3Indeed, Hall and Lazear (1984) show that an ex ante ¯xed surplus sharing rule will lead to excess separations.
4'ST' represents a stay, 'EQ' and 'IQ' an e±cient and ine±cient quit, 'EL' and 'IL' an e±cient and ine±cient
layo®, and 'ES' indicates an e±cient separation.
6and external (µ) shock are presented. If the shocks are smaller than the current match surplus
for each party (¯ijtSijt for the ¯rm and (1 ¡ ¯ijt)Sijt for the worker), the match is maintained.
If at least one of the shocks is larger, renegotiation of the surplus division is necessary to avoid
a match dissolution. The diagonal line between ¡Sijt and Sijt indicates a set of combinations of
SW
ijt and SF
ijt that can be reached when the division of the total match surplus is renegotiated,
i.e. changing ¯ijt. To the north-west of this diagonal we observe e±cient separations, since
there is no successful renegotiation possible that can compensate the shocks and thereby can
prevent a worker-¯rm match to split up. Note that a positive match-speci¯c shock does not lead
to wage renegotiations, since it does not lead to a negative surplus for either party, therefore
neither party has an incentive to initiate a separation. A similar argument goes for a negative
alternative earnings shock.
Overall, the main message of the theoretical model is threefold. First, separations are less
likely to occur if the joint surplus is high. Second, some separations may be ine±cient because
they occur when there is still a positive match-speci¯c surplus. Third, ine±cient separations
may be avoided through renegotiations. In the analysis below we will investigate to what extent
we can ¯nd empirical evidence for these theoretical ¯ndings. Before presenting the results from
our empirical analysis we ¯rst give a brief review of previous literature.
2.2 Previous literature
In the theoretical model a separation is less likely to occur if the match-speci¯c surplus is
large. Quits are less likely to occur if the worker surplus is large, layo®s are less likely if the
¯rm surplus is large. Residuals from wage regressions can be used as proxies for the worker
surplus. A wage residual measures the di®erence between the current wage and the wage that
could be obtained in a similar job given the worker and ¯rm characteristics. Obtaining an
approximation of the ¯rm surplus is a more di±cult task, because information about individual
worker productivity is absent in a lot of datasets. However, if total match surplus is shared
between the worker and the ¯rm, a larger worker surplus also implies a larger ¯rm surplus.5
5Note that if a positive wage residual indicates that a worker is overpaid compared to his peers the layo®
probability increases with the wage residual.
7In this paper, we use the wage residual as a proxy for match quality. Three theoretical
approaches explain why the residual of a wage regression is a good indicator of the quality
of the match. The ¯rst explanation is from the human capital theory (Becker (1964)), since
there may be individual-speci¯c di®erences in the amounts of speci¯c training, which may a®ect
earnings. The human capital theory predicts that wage residuals are negative for job market
entrants and positive for high-tenure workers. That is, young workers pay for investments
in speci¯c training by receiving lower wages initially, but higher wage growth later in the
career. The second explanation for match quality being re°ected in the residual is from the job
matching theory (Jovanovic (1979)). Worker-¯rm match quality is assumed to be unknown ex
ante. This theory predicts an increase in the value of the match component as workers acquire
tenure on the job, since the value of the match is revealed over time and only good matches are
maintained. According to both theories, tenure can be used as a predictor of ¯rm-speci¯c skills
(Mincer (1974)). Parent (2002) provides evidence for the importance of ¯rm-speci¯c human
capital, but ¯nds little support for the job matching theory. Yamaguchi (2003) however does
¯nd signi¯cant matching e®ects. Finally, di®erences in wage residuals can be explained by
the job search theory (Burdett (1978)). This theory states that employed workers continue
searching for jobs in which they are o®ered a higher wage. The importance of job search for
match quality is empirically con¯rmed by Yamaguchi (2003) who ¯nds that most of match
quality growth is due to job search.
Both the job matching theory, as well as the human capital theory and the job search theory,
predict that matches with high wage residuals are less likely to be dissolved. This prediction
is empirically con¯rmed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Borland and Lye (1996), Barth and
Dale-Olsen (1999) and Yamaguchi (2003). Not only individual worker e®ects, but also ¯rm
e®ects that can make up part of the wage residual appear to a®ect worker separations. In
general, high-wage ¯rms seem to have lower worker turnover than low-wage ¯rms (Powell et al.
(1994), Galizzi and Lang (1998), Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003) and Dale-Olsen (2006)).
A natural experiment is done in Abowd and Finer (1997) where changing regulations impose
that all workers that are going to be laid o® should be noti¯ed in advance. Again it is found
that workers in ¯rms with high ¯rm ¯xed e®ects stay longer with the ¯rm, even after the layo®
8noti¯cation, than workers in ¯rms with low ¯rm ¯xed e®ects. Though the matching model
(Jovanovic (1979)) states that it is especially the bad matches with negative wage residuals
that are dissolved, Lazear's raiding model (Lazear (1986)) predicts the opposite. In this model
rival ¯rms will spot high productivity workers and 'raid' them. Hence, it is especially good
matches that dissolve, through quits. Support for this theory is found by Garen (1989).
While most studies focus on separations in general, some studies distinguish between quits
and layo®s in order to examine the (di®erent) e®ect of the wage residual on worker- and ¯rm-
initiated separations. The theoretical model in the previous section predicts that the wage
residual a®ects both quits and layo®s in a similar way, because the match surplus is shared
between the worker and the ¯rm. This prediction is con¯rmed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987)
who ¯nd that the wage residual has a negative e®ect on both quits and layo®s. Also, Pfann
(2006) ¯nds that workers with low wage residuals are more likely to be laid o®. However, a more
recent study by Perticara (2004) shows that workers with a strongly negative wage residual are
more likely to quit, while a worker with a strongly positive wage residual is more likely to be
laid o® by the ¯rm. This indicates that a high wage residual is not always an indicator of a
large surplus but could also be an indicator of workers being overpaid.
The theoretical model in the previous section predicts that workers and ¯rms may want
to renegotiate the wage when a separation is imminent in order to avoid ine±cient match
dissolutions.6 As a result of this renegotiation, wages will change. Several studies have paid
attention to wage dynamics that result from separations. In general, it is found that workers
who quit experience wage gains (e.g. Perez and Rebollo (2005); Light (2005)) while dismissed
workers experience wage losses (see Farber (1999) for an overview) compared to workers who
remained with the ¯rm. However, few studies have investigated how wages are a®ected by the
ex-ante probability of separation. Workers may be willing to renegotiate their wage when they
face the risk to loose their job. Few studies have paid attention to the relationship between
wage changes and the risk of ¯rm close down. In general, wage renegotiations can be positively
and negatively related to the risk of ¯rm closing. On the one hand, workers can agree with wage
6Malcomson (1999) provides an overview of types of contracts and renegotiation possibilities. The discussion
also includes an overview of the (adverse) e®ects renegotiation may have on individual worker decisions, such
as investing in human capital.
9concessions in order to avoid ¯rm closing and displacement. On the other hand, in the face
of ¯rm closing workers can claim higher wages to compensate for the layo® risk. Hamermesh
(1988, 1991) presents a model in which wage changes that are necessary to prevent plant closing
are negotiated. He ¯nds that a negative demand shock has to be met with a far below-average
wage increase to avoid ¯rm closing. Accepting only small wage cuts is unlikely to be successful
in avoiding a shutdown. This might explain workers resistance to wage concessions, since they
have to accept a substantial wage cut with certainty in return for only a small reduction in the
¯rm closure probability. Nevertheless, Blanch°ower (1991) does ¯nd that workers in unionized
workplaces who expect to be made redundant earn 9% less than workers who do not face this
risk. A more recent paper by Carneiro and Portugal (2006) estimates a simultaneous-equations
model of ¯rm closing and wages using Portuguese data to analyze how wages are adjusted to
adverse economic shocks that increase the layo® probability. They also ¯nd that the fear of job
loss generates wage concessions rather than claims for a higher wage. All in all, it seems that
workers are willing to accept wage concessions in order to prevent job loss. Similarly, if a worker
is o®ered attractive contracts by alternative employers, the current employer may be willing to
pay the worker a higher wage in order to retain him. After making a decomposition of wage
growth Yamaguchi (2005) ¯nds that employers are indeed willing to renegotiate the workers'
wage: 20% of wage growth for young workers is due to an improved bargaining position of the
worker. We are not aware of any other study investigating ¯rms' willingness to renegotiate
the wage in order to prevent a worker from quitting. In our paper we investigate this issue in
more detail, where we investigate the change in wages as a response to expected quit and layo®
probabilities.
When ¯rms are unable to renegotiate the wage, ine±cient separations will occur (Hashimoto
and Yu (1980) and Hall and Lazear (1984)). However, even with °exible wages, ine±ciency in
separations can remain (Ramey and Watson (1997)). Note that e±cient separations only occur
when the highest wage the ¯rm is willing to pay is lower than the lowest wage the worker is
willing to accept and hence are independent of the current wage. However, due to asymmetric
information, the ¯rm does not always know the outside option of the worker, and the worker
does not always know at what wage the ¯rm will decide to replace him. Hence, in the presence
10of asymmetric information renegotiation can no longer guarantee that only e±cient separations
occur. Several studies have pointed out that in the presence of asymmetric information it
is very di±cult to design an incentive compatible contract that generates e±cient layo®s and
e±cient quits (Hall and Lazear (1984); Haltiwanger (1984)). One paper that studies ine±ciency
in separations is a recent paper by Hall (2005) which states that the sticky-wage ine±cient-
separations model does not describe the modern U.S. labor market. He uses aggregated data
to show that layo®s remained almost constant during di®erent phases of the business cycle.
Apparently, modern employment relationships are generally terminated in the joint interest of
the worker and the ¯rm and hence, ine±cient separations are not an important phenomenon
in the modern U.S. economy.7 We are not aware of any other study investigating the extent
of ine±ciency in separations. In this paper, we will add to this small literature by using wage
growth information to determine which separation is e±cient and which is ine±cient.
3 Data and stylized facts
3.1 Data
We use administrative information of workers and ¯rms in the Netherlands over the period
1993-2002.8 The dataset contains matched worker-¯rm information and has a repeated cross-
section set-up where each cross-section contains information at two points in time, one year
apart. Every year about 1900 ¯rms and 44,000 workers are sampled. The dataset does not
contain ¯nancial information about the ¯rms such as value added, output, pro¯ts, capital and
investment.9
7However, Shimer (2005) discerns from this conclusion by stating that in the analysis no attention is paid to
separations which are privately ine±cient.
8These are the AVO data; \AVO" is in Dutch: \Arbeidsvoorwaardenontwikkeling" (see Arbeidsinspectie
(2003). The data are from the Working Conditions Survey of the Dutch Ministry of Social A®airs and Em-
ployment. Unless otherwise indicated the graphs and tables in this paper are based on the AVO data. In the
analysis information from 1999 is not used since in this year no distinction is made between quits and layo®s.
9This is due to the fact that the data were designed to study changes in wages and therefore only information
from the wage administration of ¯rms was obtained. See Gielen and van Ours (2005, 2006) for a Table with AVO
means for several variables and Arbeidsinspectie (2003) for a detailed variable description and more information
about the sample design. Since the 1993 sample contains no information on public sector workers, we excluded
¯rms from this sector in other years as well. Firms from the service sector and semi-public sectors were included
in all samples.
11The data are obtained by means of a two stage sampling procedure. In the ¯rst stage, a
sample of ¯rms is drawn from the Department of Social A®airs internal ¯rm register that is
roughly similar to the ¯rm register of the Dutch statistical o±ce. The sample is drawn using a
strati¯ed design { by economic sector and ¯rm size. In the second stage, a sample of workers
within each ¯rm is drawn. Information is collected from the wage administration of the ¯rm for
two distinct moments in time: October of the year of the survey (denoted by t) and October of
the previous year (denoted by t-1). A distinction is made between workers working at the ¯rm
at both moments in time (`stayers'), workers working at the ¯rm only at time t (`entrants'),
and workers working at the ¯rm only at time t-1 (`leavers').10 The share of sampled workers
within a ¯rm decreases with ¯rm size and depends on several workers categories (covered by
collective bargaining contract or not; stayer/leaver/entrant). The sample size was increased
if certain conditions were not met.11 Because of this sampling design, some worker categories
were underrepresented in the sample.
The reason for a separation is reported by the ¯rm. A separation is denoted a quit if the
worker has started a job in another ¯rm, if he has become self-employed or if he has resigned
himself. Similarly, a separation is denoted a layo® if the worker is dismissed or left the ¯rm
because of being disabled. We focus on prime-age workers, aged between 30 and 50, in order
to abstain from other separations such as retirements or students leaving a holiday job.12
3.2 Stylized facts
Table 1 shows some stylized facts concerning the separate exit routes. For comparison, some
stylized facts for stayers are presented in the ¯rst column. It appears that large part of the
workforce concerns stable employment relationships. Separations are a decreasing function of
10Note that since workers are observed at two moments in time, we do not know the number nor the char-
acteristics of the workers who were hired after October of year t ¡ 1 and left the ¯rm before October of year
t.
11At least 10 employees had to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement and 10 not; the minimal
number of stayers, entrants and leavers had to be at least 8. This sampling design results at the ¯rm level in
random samples from subgroups of workers discerned by working in the ¯rm in October of year t or t-1, or
both, and covered by collective bargaining (or not).
12For example, young workers may enter and leave the workforce randomly, because they work few hours
next to their educational obligations. Similarly, old workers may leave the workforce because of retirement or
health considerations, which need not be in°uenced by ¯nancial reasons.
12tenure. Quits occur more often among low experience workers in small ¯rms. Layo®s are more
prevalent among low educated workers in low complexity jobs. Finally, quits seem to behave
procyclical, whereas layo®s do not show a clear cyclical pattern.
Figure 2 illustrates the average gross hourly wage for workers who stay with the ¯rm and
workers who leave. It appears that workers who quit earn relatively low hourly wages. This
con¯rms the theoretical prediction that workers with low wage residuals are more likely to quit.
However, there does not seem to be a di®erence in the average hourly wage earned by workers
who stay with the ¯rm compared to workers who are laid o®.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section we investigate in more detail which worker-¯rm matches most likely dissolve. We
distinguish between separations initiated by the worker and the ¯rm. First, we estimate a wage-
equation in order to obtain wage residuals that can be used as a proxy for match quality. Then,
we include this measure in a separations equation in order to determine the e®ect of match
quality on worker-¯rm separations. Finally, we investigate whether wages are renegotiated next
period in order to prevent the dissolution of valuable worker-¯rm matches.
4.1 Wage estimation
We estimate a Mincerian wage equation for prime-age workers where the log of the gross hourly
wage (wij) denoted in 1993 Dutch guilders is explained by worker, job and ¯rm characteristics.13
Since the panel element of our dataset is limited, we cannot include individual ¯xed e®ects in
the wage equation. Therefore, the wage residual includes both individual ability and match
quality information.14
wij = Xij¼ + ºj + °¿ij + "ij (14)
where Xij is a vector of personal (i) and job characteristics (j), ºj are ¯rm ¯xed e®ects, ¿ij
represents job tenure and "ij is an error term.
13The gross hourly wage is corrected for in°ation. 1 guilder equals approximately 0.454 euro. Note that
wij = ln(Wij), where Wij is the gross hourly wage.
14Actually, having ability and match quality in one measure is appropriate, since it avoids having zero match
quality for workers who never changed jobs.
13The results of the wage estimation can be found in the ¯rst column of Table 2.15 We ¯nd that
wages are lower for females, part-time workers and low educated workers. Moreover, it appears
that tenure and potential experience have a positive but decreasing e®ect on wages. According
to previous studies, general human capital accounts for a larger part of wage growth than
speci¯c human capital. In order to correct for potential endogeneity of tenure and experience
we re-estimate the wage equation using an instrumental variables (IV) approach, where tenure
and experience are instrumented by deviations of the means for the observations in a given
occupation-job complexity level-education level combination.16 When looking at the estimates
for tenure and experience from the IV-estimation, it appears that the OLS-estimates indeed
su®er from an estimation bias. Hence, hereafter we will continue to use the IV-estimation
results.17
The wage residual that is assumed to represent the workers' surplus is obtained by comparing
the current wage in the ¯rm to the market wage obtained from the wage equation evaluated at
zero tenure. This is done because tenure at the current ¯rm is not rewarded by another ¯rm
when changing jobs. As a result, the residual consists out of an unobserved individual match
e®ect (¹ij) { equal to the sum of the individual wage residual evaluated at current tenure and
the ¯rm ¯xed e®ect { and the tenure e®ect (°¿ij):
"
¤
ij = b ºj + b "ij + b °¿ij = b ¹ij + b °¿ij (15)
Table 3 illustrates how the wage residual is spread over the di®erent demographic groups by
showing the percentage of the workforce that belongs to a certain residual interval. It appears
15We exclude cases with tenure and experience of one year or less in order to make sure the estimates are not
a®ected by temporary contracts. Sensitivity analysis show that the exclusion of these cases does not a®ect the
results. Potential experience is computed as the worker's age minus the years of schooling attended minus 6.
Note: year dummies drop out because of the ¯rm ¯xed e®ect.
16This approach is based on Altonji and Shakotko (1987), who provide a clear overview of the nature of
the bias. This method is also the preferred method of Dustmann and Pereira (2005) who compare several IV
methods in order to avoid estimation biases in wage estimations. Since we do not have a panel dataset, we
cannot take individual means of tenure and experience. Therefore, we construct a given job type, based on
occupation, job complexity level and education, and compute average tenure and experience for this "job".
17We do not take into account potential endogeneity of the part-time work dummy variable. According to
traditional labor supply theory, part-time work is considered endogenous since the wage level determines the
number of hours worked. However, in practice, the opposite may be more likely: people choose to work either
part-time of fulltime and then investigate what wage is available for them. Therefore, we do not instrument the
variable for part-time work.
14that the wage residual is higher on average for high-experience and high-tenure workers in large
¯rms. This is due to the ¯rm ¯xed e®ect that is increasing with ¯rm size and the tenure e®ect
that is increasing with tenure. Moreover, high-residual workers seem to be more likely to stay
with the ¯rm, while low-residual workers are more likely to separate. This provides preliminary
evidence in favor of the predictions from the theoretical model.
4.2 Worker separations
In this section we investigate which worker-¯rm matches are dissolved. In particular, we de-
termine how separations are a®ected by the wage residual, which is used as a proxy for match
surplus. Figure 3 shows how the match surplus, represented by the wage residual obtained in
the previous section, a®ects worker-¯rm separations. In general, it appears that workers with
low wage residuals are more likely to quit or to be laid o®. For layo®s this is mainly due to the
tenure e®ect. The e®ect of the unobserved individual match e®ect on quits is U-shaped: quits
are more likely to occur for workers at both ends of the match e®ect distribution.
In order to investigate the e®ect of the residual on dissolving worker-¯rm matches we es-
timate logit models for separations, quits and layo®s including the wage residual in the set of
regressors. We compute robust standard errors, where we correct for correlation of the error
terms within ¯rms. Moreover, since we use a generated regressor, i.e. the wage residual, in
the analysis, we adjust the asymptotic covariance matrix along the lines of Murphy and Topel
(1985). The e®ect of the total wage residual ("¤
ij) is presented in panel A of Table 4. Linear
e®ects (panel A.1.) enter the model signi¯cantly only in the layo® equation. When asymmetry
in the e®ects is allowed for (panel A.2.), we ¯nd that the e®ect of the residual on separations
is U-shaped: workers at both ends of the wage residual distribution are most likely to quit.
Lower end workers may be more likely to search for another job since they are underpaid. This
underpayment may be due to a bad worker-¯rm match (Jovanovic (1979)). Also, the high quit
propensity for low-residual workers may be due to a low ¯rm ¯xed e®ect, which is an indicator
for future wage growth (Galizzi and Lang (1998)). The e®ects for workers at the top end of
the distribution provide evidence for the raiding model (Lazear (1986)): high residual workers
are more likely to quit since ¯rms will spot the high ability of these workers and raid them.
15This U-pattern is not found for layo®s, that seem to occur mainly among workers with negative
wage residuals. An LR-test indicates that introducing quadratic e®ects (panel A.3.) does not
improve the model. In panel B of the Table, the individual e®ects of the separate residual ele-
ments are investigated. Tenure e®ects appear to reduce all separations, as predicted by Parsons
(1972), while larger match e®ects (¹ij) only reduce layo®s (panel B.1.). When asymmetry in
the separate e®ects is allowed for (panel B.2.), we ¯nd that the U-shaped e®ect of the residual
on quits and separations (from panel A.2.) is due to a U-shaped pattern in the match e®ect.
However, the layo® probability is only a®ected by negative match values. This is in line with
Bishop (1990), who ¯nds that layo® rates are negatively related to match quality measures.
Again, introducing quadratic e®ects (panel B.3.) does not improve the model.
The parameter estimates in Table 4 show that separations are not a linear function of the
wage residual. In order to identify the separation pattern in more detail we use a °exible spline
function. Then we estimate a logit model for quits and layo®s separately, where the quit or layo®
decision is dependent among other things on the wage residual, conditional upon the residual
interval it belongs to. The results are used to predict the quit and layo® probability. Figure 4
illustrates the relationship between the wage residual and quit and layo®s, respectively. Again
we ¯nd the U-shaped pattern for quits. On the other hand, layo®s appear to be a random
process, i.e. independent of the residual. Although we ¯nd some signi¯cant e®ects for the
wage residual on layo®s, the overall layo® probability is very small: average predicted layo®
probability is 1.19, while the average predicted quit probability is 6.18. Consequently, the
e®ects of the wage residual on the layo® probability are even smaller. Moreover, there does not
seem to be a relation between the quit probability and the layo® probability.
4.3 Wage renegotiations
The previous analysis has provided us with estimated quit and layo® probabilities. We are in-
terested in whether ¯rms and workers respond to these separation probabilities by renegotiating
the match surplus. Our dataset contains two wage observations of workers that are present in
the ¯rm at both the ¯rst date (t) and the second date (t + 1). Assuming that the wage at the
16¯rst date is determined by a match-speci¯c component (®ij)18, the wage at the second date is
determined by this match-speci¯c component, a general e®ect representing national shocks (Ã)
and individual-speci¯c expected probabilities to quit ( ^ Pq) or to be laid-o® ( ^ Pl). So, wijt = ®ij
and wij;t+1 = ®ij + Ã + ±1 ^ Pq;i + ±2 ^ Pl;i.19 Taking ¯rst di®erences we ¯nd
¢wijt = Ã + ±1 ^ Pq;i + ±2 ^ Pl;i
The expected probabilities ^ Pq and ^ Pl are an indication of the quality of the match in relation
to external and match-speci¯c shocks. If ^ Pq is high the worker is underpaid and/or the shock
to the outside option is large and the individual has a large incentive to quit. If ^ Pl is high the
worker may be overpaid or subject to a negative match-speci¯c shock and has a high probability
to be laid o®. If wage renegotiations occur than this should be revealed by the parameters ±1
and ±2. A wage renegotiation to prevent a quit is likely if ±1 > 0, a wage renegotiation to
prevent a lay-o® is likely if ±2 < 0.
The ¯rst estimate presented in Table 5 indeed shows that both ±-parameters have the
expected sign and are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. Apparently there are wage renegotiations
to prevent separations. However, since the available wage information concerns a non-random
selection of workers that stayed with the ¯rm least squares estimates may be biased. We correct
for this selectivity by using a Heckman type selection term. As shown in the second row of Table
5 our parameter estimates are hardly a®ected by the introduction of the selectivity term. As a
last sensitivity analysis we also introduced the actual changes in employment in the ¯rm (¢Ej)
and the relevant industry (¢Es). Both variables are also included in the estimated probabilities
to quit or being laid-o® but as the third row of Table 5 shows they have direct e®ects as well.
Both an increase in the employment of the ¯rm and an increase in the employment of the
relevant industry have positive e®ects on the wage growth of the individuals. The ¯rst e®ect
could be an indication that growing ¯rms can a®ord paying wage increases. The second e®ect
may indicate that employers are willing to pay their workers more if employment in the relevant
industry is growing to prevent their workers from leaving the ¯rm, over and above the e®ect of
the predicted quit probability. As shown the size of the relevant parameters are a®ected by the
18One can think of ®ij = f(At + (1 ¡ ¯ijt)Sijt):
19Note that wij represents the log of the gross hourly wage.
17introduction of the additional variables but the signs are still correct and both ±-parameters
still di®er signi¯cantly from zero. As an alternative, the second column presents estimates for
both ±-parameters when total earnings growth is used as dependent variable. Total earnings
include °exible wage components, such as pro¯t sharing, individual bonuses, and commissions,
and remaining additional payments. The results remain unchanged.
All in all we conclude that ¯rms and workers are apparently willing to renegotiate the
division of the match surplus if the other party has a high propensity to dissolve the match.
4.4 Are separations e±cient?
In the previous section we have found that wages are renegotiated as a response to current
separation probabilities in order to avoid valuable worker-¯rm matches to break up. In this
section we use this information to investigate the e±ciency and ine±ciency of quits and layo®s.
According to equation (6) we expect to observe a quit if the new worker surplus, after the
shocks and renegotiation have taken place, falls below zero, i.e. (1 ¡ ¯ij;t+1)Sij;t+1 < 0. Hence,
using the previous estimation results, the model predicts a quit if the wage renegotiation, d ¢wij
that we obtained in the previous section20, was insu±cient to compensate for the negative
worker surplus ("¤
ij), i.e. d ¢wij + "¤
ij < 0. If the wage change is larger, we expect the worker to
stay with the ¯rm. Similarly, equation (8) indicates we expect to observe a layo® if the new
¯rm surplus falls below zero, i.e. ¯ij;t+1Sij;t+1 < 0. The model predicts a layo® if the worker
performs worse than the average worker, i.e. d ¢wij ¡ ¢wj < 0.21 If the wage change is larger,
the worker is expected to stay with the ¯rm.
A comparison of actual and predicted separations is presented in Table 6. As the table
shows predicting actual quits is not easy. Our predicted quit decision is correct for 43% of
the workers that quit. This imprecision is due to unobserved determinants of quits. We have
no information about external job o®ers individuals may have received or about non-monetary
value the worker attaches to his or her job. A similar story holds for layo®s. Here the percentage
20We use the second estimate of the wage growth model from Table 5.
21Note that we approximate the new ¯rm surplus by the di®erence between the predicted wage growth for
the individual worker (d ¢wij) and the actual average wage growth that is paid by the ¯rm to remaining workers
(¢wj). This approximation provides an indicator for the worker quality compared to the average worker in the
workforce.
18of correct predicted layo®s is 58%. The imperfect prediction of layo®s may be due to the lack
of information about worker productivity not re°ected in the wage.22
To give an indication about the relative size of the ine±ciency of separations we investigate
the category correctly predicted quits and layo®s in more detail. According to equation (9) a
separation is de¯ned e±cient if the sum of the shocks is larger than the former joint match
surplus, or similarly, if the sum of the new worker and ¯rm surpluses falls below zero, i.e.
SW
ij;t+1+SF










If the new joint match surplus is larger than zero, the separation is denoted ine±cient.
Table 7 presents the percentages of ine±cient quits and layo®s. The results indicate that
only 5% of correct predicted quits is ine±cient, while 47% of correct predicted layo®s is ine±-
cient. The ine±ciency among layo®s is much higher, which could be due to the fact that even
though wage renegotiation would be possible and the worker would be better o® with the new
lower wage it does not occur because of wage rigidity. Introducing lower wages for some of
the workers might harm labor relations within a ¯rm to the extent that the lower wage would
reduce labor productivity. Moreover, we investigate whether the wage rigidity is caused by lim-
ited renegotiation possibilities due to a binding minimum wage. However, the minimum wage
appeared to be not binding, therefore this cannot explain the ine±ciency in layo®s. As part of
sensitivity analysis, panel B of the table also presents the percentage of ine±cient separations
when using the predicted average wage growth among all workers in the ¯rm (d ¢wj).23 Even
though the results for layo®s do not change much, ine±ciency in quits is much lower. Appar-
ently, the selection in worker out°ow causes the actual average wage change among stayers to
be lower than the predicted wage change among all workers. This indicates that, even though
¯rms are willing to compensate workers with a high quit propensity by providing a larger wage
growth, this is insu±cient to persuade these workers to remain with the ¯rm. In order to in-
vestigate whether worker characteristics in°uence the ine±ciency in separations, we decompose
22As part of sensitivity analysis, we redid our analysis using the predicted average wage growth among all
workers rather than the actual wage growth among remaining workers, because due to selective worker out°ow
the former may be di®erent from the latter. However, the results remain almost the same: the percentage
correct predicted quits remains the same, while the percentage correct predicted layo®s increases to 59%.
23The disadvantage of using the predicted average wage growth among all workers in the ¯rm is that the
results depend on the assumptions made in the model, while the actual average wage growth among stayers is
observed, therefore independent of model assumptions.
19separations for di®erent types of workers, distinguished by gender, length of tenure, education
level and whether or not the wage was collectively bargained.24 The results are presented in
panel C of Table 7. In general, ine±ciency in layo®s is much more common than in quits for all
types of workers. However, we can observe some small di®erences between the di®erent types
of workers. Women appear to have more ine±cient quits, but less ine±cient layo®s than men.
The ine±ciency in quits among women may be explained by women leaving the labor mar-
ket for family care reasons. A possible explanation for the lower ine±ciency in layo®s among
women is that women may not only renegotiate over wages, but also over working hours. Since
women are more likely to work part-time, they may be more willing to adjust working hours
than their fulltime working male counterparts. This higher °exibility may reduce ine±ciency
in layo®s. However, we do not ¯nd an indication for this in the data. Workers with high tenure
or a high education level experience less ine±ciency in quits, but more ine±ciency in layo®s.
This may indicate that the information about the (high) quality of worker skills (either general
or ¯rm-speci¯c) is asymmetric: workers are better able to value the quality of their skills, and
hence of the match, than ¯rms. Finally, ine±ciency in layo®s is much higher in ¯rms where
wages are collectively bargained. All in all, the dominant outcome of our analysis is that only
a small percentage of quits but a substantial part of layo®s are ine±cient.
5 Conclusions
The current paper investigates which worker-¯rm matches are most likely to dissolve and
whether wages are renegotiated when valuable matches run the risk of being terminated. Our
empirical analysis is based on matched worker-¯rm data for the Netherlands over the period
1993-2002. The dataset allows us to study the nature of worker separations in great detail.
We ¯nd that worker separations are not a linear function of the match surplus. While
workers with low match surpluses are most likely to quit or to be laid o®, also workers with
very high match surpluses are likely to quit, possibly because ¯rms compete with each other
to attract these high ability workers. Moreover, we ¯nd that wages are renegotiated when
24Here we use the actual average wage growth among remaining workers. When using the predicted average
wage growth among all workers, ine±ciency in quits disappears, while the ine±ciency in layo®s is unchanged.
20valuable employment relationships are likely to end. Firms increase wages for workers that
have a high propensity to quit to persuade them to stay, whereas workers that are likely to
be laid o® are willing to sacri¯ce some part of their earnings in order to avoid layo®. As a
share of all separations the ine±cient ones are not very important. However, there is a clear
di®erence between quits and layo®s. Whereas ine±cient quits are rare ine±cient layo®s occur
frequently. These phenomena may be related to downward wage rigidity. While it is easy to
renegotiate higher wages to prevent quits it is much more di±cult to renegotiate lower wages
to prevent layo®s even if that would overall be bene¯cial to the workers involved. To the
extent that the laid-o® workers will have di±culties to ¯nd a new job this ine±ciency has a
wider impact. The ine±ciency which could have been avoided if the negative wage rigidity had
not been an externality of the process of wage negotiations now leads to higher unemployment
insurance payments. Government intervention aiming at removing this externality - for example
by introducing wage costs subsidies for workers at risk of being laid-o® ine±ciently - could be
Pareto e±cient. However to implement such a policy and distinguish between e±cient and
ine±cient layo®s will not be easy.
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Primary 92.6 5.7 1.7
Junior General 92.2 6.6 1.2
Pre-vocational 93.7 4.9 1.5
Senior General 91.4 7.4 1.2
Senior Vocational 93.2 5.9 0.9
Vocational College 91.9 7.4 0.7
University 88.4 10.7 0.9
Wage contract
CAO 93.5 5.4 1.1
AVV 91.5 7.1 1.4
No collective wage agreement 89.7 9.1 1.2
Experience (years)a
0-1 - - -
2-5 - - -
6-10 87.2 11.6 1.1
11-15 90.5 8.5 1.0
16-20 91.7 7.3 1.0
21-30 94.1 4.7 1.2
30+ 95.0 3.5 1.5
Tenure (years)b
0-1 - - -
2-5 89.0 9.4 1.6
6-10 92.3 6.6 1.1
11-15 95.1 4.2 0.8
16-20 96.3 3.0 0.7
21-30 97.5 1.6 0.9
30+ 98.6 1.2 0.2
Job Complexity Level
F1 91.5 6.7 1.8
F2 92.5 5.9 1.6
F3 93.1 5.5 1.4
F4 92.5 6.5 1.0
F5 92.3 7.0 0.7
F6 91.2 8.1 0.7
Continued on next page




Agriculture 93.3 5.8 0.9
Industry 94.8 3.9 1.3
Construction 93.0 5.4 1.6
Trade, catering 90.6 8.1 1.3
Transport 94.1 4.9 1.0
Financial services 90.6 8.5 0.9
Health and other 92.7 6.4 0.9
Firm size
1-9 89.3 8.9 1.7
10-19 90.5 8.3 1.3
20-49 92.5 5.9 1.6
50-99 93.3 5.5 1.2
100-199 92.5 6.0 1.5
200-499 93.1 5.8 1.1
500+ 93.7 5.6 0.7
Year
1993 94.3 4.3 1.4
1994 95.0 3.8 1.2
1995 94.0 5.0 1.1
1996 93.8 5.1 1.2
1997 92.7 5.8 1.5
1998 91.6 7.5 0.9
1999c 89.3 - -
2000 90.0 9.2 0.8
2001 89.3 9.7 1.0
2002 90.4 8.4 1.2
N = 106146 92.6 6.3 1.1
Note: Worker-speci¯c weights are used to obtain represen-
tative results for the Netherlands.
a No observations for low experience workers, because we
focus on prime-age workers (aged between 30 and 50).
b No observation for low tenure workers since we restricted
the analysis to workers with more than one year of tenure,
in order to get rid of temporary contracts.
c No detailed separation information for the year 1999 is
available.
27Table 2: Parameter estimates wage equation
OLS IV
(1) (2)
Tenure 0:067 (0:003)¤¤ 0:040 (0:004)¤¤
Tenure2 ¡0:017 (0:000)¤¤ ¡0:008 (0:000)¤¤
Experience 0:276 (0:005)¤¤ 0:453 (0:011)¤¤
Experience2 ¡0:050 (0:000)¤¤ ¡0:092 (0:000)¤¤
Female ¡0:078 (0:002)¤¤ ¡0:075 (0:002)¤¤
Part-time ¡0:004 (0:002)¤¤ ¡0:005 (0:002)¤¤
Occupation
Technical 0:012 (0:002)¤¤ 0:011 (0:002)¤¤
Administrative 0:005 (0:002)¤¤ 0:005 (0:002)¤¤
Computer 0:014 (0004)¤¤ 0:014 (0:004)¤¤
Commercial 0:076 (0:003)¤¤ 0:077 (0:003)¤¤
Creative ¡0:009 (0:004)¤¤ ¡0:008 (0:004)¤¤
Management 0:092 (0:003)¤¤ 0:091 (0:002)¤¤
Wage contract
CAO ¡0:080 (0:003)¤¤ ¡0:079 (0:003)¤¤
AVV ¡0:075 (0:017)¤¤ ¡0:079 (0:017)¤¤
Education level
Primary ¡0:107 (0:003)¤¤ ¡0:088 (0:004)¤¤
Junior general ¡0:091 (0:003)¤¤ ¡0:092 (0:003)¤¤
Pre-vocational ¡0:072 (0:002)¤¤ ¡0:074 (0:002)¤¤
Senior general ¡0:026 (0:002)¤¤ ¡0:029 (0:002)¤¤
Vocational colleges 0:070 (0:002)¤¤ 0:073 (0:002)¤¤
University 0:156 (0:004)¤¤ 0:164 (0:004)¤¤
Job complexity level
f2 0:044 (0:004)¤¤ 0:044 (0:004)¤¤
f3 0:135 (0:004)¤¤ 0:135 (0:004)¤¤
f4 0:290 (0:005)¤¤ 0:291 (0:005)¤¤
f5 0:476 (0:005)¤¤ 0:474 (0:005)¤¤
f6 0:720 (0:006)¤¤ 0:712 (0:006)¤¤
Constant 2:615 (0:007)¤¤ 2:453 (0:012)¤¤
Note: Dependent variable is log of gross hourly wages, de-
noted in 1993 Dutch guilders. Estimations are based on
106146 observations. Tenure (*0.1) and experience (*0.1)
are instrumented by deviations from means for observations
in \jobs" de¯ned by occupation, job complexity level and
education. Also, observations with tenure and experience
less than or equal to one year are excluded. The reference
group is male, occupation service oriented, no collective
bargained wage contract, senior vocational education level,
job complexity level 1, fulltime. Standard errors in paren-
theses, a **/* indicates that the coe±cient is di®erent from
zero at a 5%/10% level of signi¯cance.
28Table 3: Wage residual interval and observable characteristics
(in % of the workforce)
Wage residual ("¤
i)
< ¡0:3 ¡0:3 to ¡0:1 ¡0:1 to 0 0 to 0:1 0:1 to 0:3 ¸ 0:3
Gender
Male 2.6 18.0 19.1 20.8 28.1 11.4
Female 3.3 17.3 20.0 22.2 28.5 8.6
Education level
Primary 5.5 31.2 23.4 16.9 17.7 5.2
Junior general 3.1 19.9 19.3 20.8 26.6 10.4
Pre-vocational 2.3 17.8 20.6 22.1 28.9 8.3
Senior general 3.4 15.7 17.0 23.2 30.0 10.7
Senior vocational 2.0 14.8 19.5 21.6 31.1 11.1
Vocational colleges 2.9 17.1 18.8 21.3 27.9 11.9
University 5.2 18.4 15.3 18.2 25.0 18.0
Experience (years)
6-10 4.2 15.6 20.0 21.9 29.4 8.9
11-15 2.2 15.3 20.2 21.9 30.4 10.0
16-20 2.6 18.0 19.2 22.3 28.3 9.6
21-30 3.2 19.4 19.2 20.2 26.9 11.0
30+ 2.5 15.1 19.0 21.7 29.6 12.1
Tenure (years)
2-5 5.6 23.2 20.3 19.5 23.0 8.4
6-10 2.4 17.4 19.6 21.9 28.7 10.1
11-15 1.3 14.9 19.1 21.9 30.7 12.1
16-20 1.6 15.0 18.4 22.1 31.8 11.1
21-30 1.3 13.8 18.4 22.1 31.2 13.2
30+ 0.0 9.1 19.3 21.8 39.3 10.4
Job complexity
F1 2.7 32.2 26.1 18.1 17.3 3.7
F2 4.0 25.0 23.9 20.4 21.5 5.2
F3 2.8 17.0 19.0 21.8 30.6 8.8
F4 2.0 15.2 18.8 22.4 30.2 11.5
F5 2.9 17.4 19.3 20.3 27.1 13.0
F6 5.6 20.5 15.6 18.2 24.4 15.7
Wage contract
CAO 1.8 16.1 19.3 21.9 29.9 10.9
AVV 6.1 25.7 18.8 19.1 24.0 6.3
No collective wage 8.1 25.6 19.8 17.9 19.9 8.7
Continued on next page
29Table 3 { continued from previous page
Wage residual ("¤
i)
< ¡0:3 ¡0:3 to ¡0:1 ¡0:1 to 0 0 to 0:1 0:1 to 0:3 ¸ 0:3
Occupation
Technical 1.7 17.8 19.6 20.9 29.3 10.6
Administrative 2.7 14.1 18.4 24.8 31.3 8.8
Computer 4.2 16.9 18.4 20.4 28.6 11.5
Commercial 6.2 25.9 17.8 17.9 22.6 9.7
Service 2.7 18.0 21.3 21.6 27.4 9.0
Creative 2.5 13.2 16.0 21.7 28.0 18.5
Management 3.8 18.3 17.9 18.8 27.1 14.2
Firm size
1-9 12.0 24.3 29.1 16.2 15.2 3.3
10-19 7.5 24.5 20.8 20.6 21.6 5.0
20-49 4.9 23.0 21.2 20.9 24.0 6.0
50-99 3.1 21.0 21.8 22.0 24.8 7.1
100-199 3.3 19.0 21.2 22.6 25.9 8.1
200-499 2.0 17.2 20.3 22.3 28.4 9.8
500+ 2.6 16.8 18.1 20.7 29.7 12.1
Sector
Agriculture, ¯shing 1.3 14.4 20.1 24.2 26.0 14.0
Industry 1.5 15.5 18.2 20.3 31.6 12.8
Construction 0.8 13.8 17.8 25.2 34.3 8.1
Trade and catering 5.4 25.1 22.1 21.3 20.3 5.8
Transport, storage 3.5 16.0 19.0 17.8 30.8 12.9
Financial services 4.7 21.1 18.4 21.3 24.1 10.3
Health care 2.6 16.5 21.2 22.9 28.0 8.8
Exit route
Stay 2.7 17.7 19.4 21.3 28.4 10.5
Layo® 5.2 18.3 19.9 20.2 26.2 10.2
Quit 4.6 20.4 16.7 25.6 23.9 8.8
N = 106146 2.9 17.8 19.4 21.2 28.2 10.5
Note: Worker-speci¯c weights are used to obtain representative results for the Netherlands.






ij ¡0:187 (0:145) ¡0:045 (0:155) ¡1:191 (0:265)¤¤
A.2. Asymmetric main e®ects
"¤
ij given "¤
ij > 0 0:448 (0:196)¤¤ 0:602 (0:209)¤¤ ¡0:621 (0:464)
j"¤
ijj given "¤
ij < 0 1:239 (0:264)¤¤ 1:154 (0:283)¤¤ 1:858 (0:364)¤¤
A.3. Asymmetric linear and quadratic e®ects
"¤
ij given "¤




ij > 0 ¡0:278 (0:497) ¡0:462 (0:544) 0:558 (0:885)
j"¤
ijj given "¤




ij < 0 0:781 (0:644) 1:109 (0:817) ¡2:278 (2:275)
B. Residual components
B.1. Linear e®ects
¹ij ¡0:008 (0:137) 0:113 (0:146) ¡0:884 (0:258)¤¤
¿ij ¡0:293 (0:022)¤¤ ¡0:282 (0:022)¤¤ ¡0:315 (0:045)¤¤
B.2. Asymmetric main e®ects
¹ij given ¹ij > 0 0:449 (0:210)¤¤ 0:586 (0:224)¤¤ ¡0:504 (0:493)
j¹ijj given ¹ij < 0 0:664 (0:257)¤¤ 0:591 (0:279)¤¤ 1:271 (0:372)¤¤
¿ij ¡0:288 (0:022)¤¤ ¡0:276 (0:022)¤¤ ¡0:312 (0:045)¤¤
B.3. Asymmetric linear and quadratic e®ects
¹ij given ¹ij > 0 0:626 (0:311)¤¤ 0:872 (0:343)¤¤ ¡0:744 (0:731)
¹ij
2 given ¹ij > 0 ¡0:442 (0:532) ¡0:650 (0:592) 0:674 (0:815)
j¹ijj given ¹ij < 0 0:166 (0:421) ¡0:025 (0:467) 1:725 (1:014)¤
j¹ijj
2 given ¹ij < 0 1:198 (0:655)¤ 1:521 (0:773)¤¤ ¡1:238 (1:901)
¿ij ¡0:265 (0:081)¤¤ ¡0:190 (0:088)¤¤ ¡0:635 (0:195)¤¤
¿ij
2 ¡0:041 (0:013) ¡0:016 (0:015) 0:056 (0:033)¤
Note: Estimations are based on 106146 observations. Observations with tenure
and experience less than or equal to one year are excluded. Estimates for other
explanatory variables, such as gender, age, age squared, occupation, wage con-
tract, education level, job complexity level, part-time work, cyclical indica-
tors (aggregate, sectoral, ¯rm-speci¯c), ¯rm size and sector, are not presented.
Tenure e®ects (¿) are multiplied with 100. Robust Murphy-Topel (1985) stan-
dard errors in parentheses, a **/* indicates that the coe±cient is di®erent from
zero at a 5%/10% level of signi¯cance.
31Table 5: Panel estimates wage growth estimation
Wage growth Total earnings growth
(1) (2)
1. Baseline
^ Pq 0:181 (0:011)¤¤ 0:182 (0:012)¤¤
^ Pl ¡0:207 (0:027)¤¤ ¡0:229 (0:030)¤¤
2. Selectivity
^ Pq 0:122 (0:011)¤¤ 0:123 (0:012)¤¤
^ Pl ¡0:222 (0:028)¤¤ ¡0:245 (0:031)¤¤
3. Selectivity
^ Pq 0:155 (0:013)¤¤ 0:158 (0:014)¤¤
^ Pl ¡0:062 (0:027)¤¤ ¡0:067 (0:029)¤¤
¢Ej 0:047 (0:004)¤¤ 0:052 (0:004)¤¤
¢Es 0:064 (0:017)¤¤ 0:079 (0:019)¤¤
Dependent variable is wage growth, wit - wi;t¡1, and total earn-
ings growth, wtot
it - wtot
i;t¡1, where wtot includes additional pay-
ments. In estimates 2 and 3 selectivity is accounted for using the
inverse Mill's ratio based on a probit estimate of the probability
to separate (see Table 4).
The dependent variable is regressed on the same individual, job
and worker characteristics as the wage estimation in Table 2; the
selection equation is de¯ned as a multinomial logit model (stay,
quit, layo®) and is explained by the same worker, job and ¯rm
characteristics as in Table 4. Robust Murphy-Topel (1985) stan-
dard errors in parentheses, a **/* indicates that the coe±cient is
di®erent from zero at a 5%/10% level of signi¯cance.
32Table 6: Actual and predicted worker-¯rm separations
Actual:
% Quit Layo® Stay
Predicted:
Quit 43.1 18.3 20.6
Layo® 20.5 58.3 51.1
Stay 36.4 23.4 28.3




Observed average wage change among remaining workers:
¢wj 5.0 47.0
B. Sensitivity analysis
Predicted average wage change among all workers:
d ¢wj 0.9 47.2





5 years or less 6.2 43.4







Note: Low educated workers have a senior general degree or lower, while high
educated workers have a senior vocational degree or higher.
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Note: S = stay, IQ = ine±cient quit, EQ = e±cient quit, IL = ine±cient layo®, EL = e±cient layo®, ES =
e±cient separation.









Note: For 1999 speci¯c separation information is missing. Hourly wages are denoted in 1993 Dutch guilders.
1 guilder = 0.454 euro
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Note: Based on results from spline estimation.
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